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BOOK REVIEWS
Competition and Railroad Price Discrimination. JoRDAN JAY HILLmAN. Evanston, Illinois: The Transportation Center at Northwestern University. 1968. Pp. xii, 164. $7.50.
No more occult ritual is observed in the law than the tri-partite
process by which railroad rates are fixed. Mr. Hillman's book offers a
microscopic view into each aspect of this complex triad, from legislative articulation of policy to enforcement of the statutory standard
by the administrative agency and review by the courts. Although careful to avoid striking any accusatory notes, his thorough analysis lays
bare the inherent debilities of the oldest of our regulatory processes.
The major portion of the book is devoted to tracing the ancient
battle against long-haul discrimination by railroads-the imposition of a
lower charge for a longer haul along the same line. This decried practice,
which discriminated against shippers who incurred higher rates for
shorter hauls, first became the concern of Congress in the 1870's.
For the better part of two decades, Congress pondered the dilemma created by the fact that price discrimination of this nature was
often militated by the force of competition. Thus, short-haul shippers
located at noncompetitive points were charged higher rates pegged at
what the traffic would bear in order that long-haul shippers could be
lured from the waterways and from other rail carriers with prices
geared solely to marginal costs. Although the inequality and its political
overtones were obvious, a Spencerian age could not comfortably condemn the competitive motive that often prompted the discrimination.
The legislative debates were conducted in a confused atmosphere
where neither economic nor political reality was clearly defined. The
dilemma was never resolved, but the conclusion was reached that such
important decisions could not be left to the whimsical discretion of
unregulated railroads.
An uneasy compromise was finally reached in section 4 of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which provided that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of
like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the
same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within
the longer distance .... 1
1

Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, § 4, 24 Stat. 380, as amended, 49 US,C. § 4(1) (1964).
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Whether the words "under substantially similar circumstances and
conditions" would justify price discrimination to meet competitive
forces was left uncertain, advocates for both sides citing the same words
as supporting irreconcilable positions. In the words of one of the
draftsmen: "[T]he best we can do is to pass the best bill we can, and
it is for the commission and the railroads and the courts to construe
it afterward." 2
The interpretation of the statute over the next twenty-three years
is described in a chapter aptly sub-titled "The Fruits of Cultivated
Ambiguity." From 1887 to 1910, the Commission and the Supreme
Court entered the fray with a bitter exhibition of battledore and
shuttlecock. At every opportunity, the Commission used its regulatory
powers to promote what it felt to be the dominant egalitarian theme
of the 1887 Act which it viewed as flatly requiring "the same rates for
similar services rendered by the carrier in transporting similar freight
over its line."3 With equal persistence, the Supreme Court sought to
justify competitively induced discrimination.
Notwithstanding reversals of its orders, the Commission insisted
that competition was "wasteful," 4 while the Court remained adamant
in the view that "free and unrestricted competition in the matter of
railroad charges.., is the law now governing the subject." 5 Only with
the passage of the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 was the Commission's view
as to section 4 of the Act to prevail.6
That it should have taken over thirty years to develop a major
point in transportation policy is not merely an interesting historical
reflection on the leisurely pace of a past era. Even today the question
of how low modem railroads may reduce costs to meet intermodal
competition threatens to break all records for length in progressing to
ultimate resolution. In 1940, Congress, in a major declaration of National Transportation Policy, stated its goal to be the "fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions
2 p. 22, quoting Senator Cullum, 18 CONG. REc. 490 (1887).

3 New York Bd. of Trade & Transp. v. Penn. R.R., 4 I.C.C. 447, 514, 3 I.C. Rep.
417, 444 (1891).
4 14 ICC ANN. Re. 13 (1900).

5 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 337 (1897).
6 The amendment of 1910, inter alia, deleted the troublesome clause, "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 8, 36
Stat. 547.
The identical language in § 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, dealing with special
rates and rebates, remains to this day because it was indicated that Congress intended
different meanings to the same words in §§ 2 and 4. Wight v. United States, 167 U.S.
512, 518 (1897) (dicta).
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of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent
A decade later it became apparent that the
advantages of each ....
Commission was using its rate-making powers to handicap railroads in
meeting other competitors, such as barges which had cost but not service advantages. The matter was ultimately redefined by Congress in
1958. The power of the Commission over reasonable minimum charges
was tempered by a directive that rates "shall not be held up to a
particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national
transportation policy declared in this Act.""
The fruits of this new cultivated ambiguity are still being culled.
While the Commission considered that the 1958 amendment "brought
about no fundamental change in the law," the Supreme Court, in
1963, admonished the Commission that it had improperly interpreted
the mandate of Congress. 10 By mid-1968, however, the matter of how
the statute should be enforced was still unresolved. Concurring in the
Ingot Molds decision," Justice Harlan properly noted that the question was still where it was five years ago, with new litigation required
2
to resolve the issue.'
In the face of such frustrations, it is not surprising that railroads
increasingly cast about for diversification in unregulated industriesl
As Mr. Hillman's painstaking analysis reveals, a chief problem is
that the regulatory process must grapple with modem transportation
complexities using an outmoded statutory scheme derived from the
political environment of another age. Sadly, history may support the
author's conclusion that future Congresses will no better than past
ones be able to subordinate political considerations to the "logic
of economics." Although unavoidably following from these premises,
the author's conclusion that the job must be left to a revitalized
regulatory process ends the book on a too quixotic tenor. Not only
the transportation industry, but all who labor in jurisprudence,
would welcome an elaboration of Mr. Hillman's thesis that administrative agencies and reviewing courts should now grasp that hitherto
evasive formula that will henceforth permit them to avoid easy rationalizations, perceive more deeply distinctions between present and past
"7

7 Interstate Commerce Act of 1940, § 1, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C. § Int (1964).
8 Transportation Act of 1958, § 6, 72 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1964).
9 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635, 642 (D. Conn. 1961).
10 ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
11 American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville S. N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968).
12 Id. at 597.
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economic policies, recognize candidly the limitations of precedent, and
focus on present issues of substance, freely overruling archaic decisions
whenever necessary.
In 1962, President Kennedy described the situation as a "chaotic
patchwork of inconsistent and often obsolete legislation and regulation."' 3 Now as in the past, this situation subjects transportation to
"excessive, cumbersome and time-consuming regulatory supervision
that shackles and distorts managerial initiative." 14 Mr. Hillman has
given us a valuable documentation of this theme.
Robert W. Blanchette*
13 Transportation Message

from President Kennedy to Congress, 108

CONG.

REC.

5985 (1962).
14 Id.
* Member of the Connecticut Bar; General Attorney-New England, Penn Central
Company, formerly General Counsel of the New Haven Railroad. BA. 1953, University
of Connecticut; LL.B. 1957, Yale Law School.

